Toward a Balanced Equation: Advocating Consistency in the Sentencing of Serial Killers by Ebrite, Talitha
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 58 Number 4 
2006 
Toward a Balanced Equation: Advocating Consistency in the 
Sentencing of Serial Killers 
Talitha Ebrite 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Talitha Ebrite, Toward a Balanced Equation: Advocating Consistency in the Sentencing of Serial Killers, 58 
OKLA. L. REV. 685 (2005), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
1. Sigmund Freud, Analysis Terminable and Interminable, in 23 THE STANDARD EDITION
OF THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 216, 235 (James Strachey ed., 1937), available
at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/s/sigmundfre151783.html.




5. People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ill. 1984), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-2-4 (1996), as recognized in People v. Wilhoite, 592 N.E.2d
48 (Ill. App. 1991).
6. Id.
7. MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 80.
8. Id.
9. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d at 1190.
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COMMENT
Toward a Balanced Equation: Advocating Consistency in
the Sentencing of Serial Killers
Every normal person, in fact, is only normal on the average.  His
ego approximates to that of the psychotic in some part or other and
to a greater or lesser extent.
— Sigmund Freud1
I. Introduction
Robert Piest was a hardworking fifteen-year-old boy who held down a part-
time job at a pharmacy in addition to maintaining a position on his high school
honor roll.   He was also a gymnast and an amateur photographer.   One2 3
evening at work, he overheard the pharmacy’s building contractor discuss how
much he paid his employees, a figure that sparked young Robert’s interest.4
When Robert’s mother came to pick him up after work, he asked her to wait
while he spoke to the contractor about some extra work.   His mother never5
saw him alive again.6
Rather than offer the young man a job in construction, the building
contractor lured Robert into his car and suggested that Robert could more
easily make money by selling his body for sex.   The man then drove the boy7
to a suburban Chicago home where he subjected him to a night of torture.8
The contractor handcuffed Robert, tried to perform oral sodomy on him,
forcibly raped him, and later strangled him with a rope.   The next day, the9
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10. MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 80.
11. Id.
12. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d at 1181.
13. Id. at 1176, 1190. 
14. Id. at 1176, 1180-81.
15. Id. at 1176.
16. Id. at 1189-91.
17. Id. at 1191.  After meeting Gacy at a bar, Jeffrey Rignall was chloroformed, bound,
orally and anally sodomized, and then left, unconscious, next to a statue in a Chicago park.  Id.
Michel Ried had moved in with and was working for Gacy when Gacy inexplicably hit him with
a hammer, stating “he did not know what had come over him, but that he felt like he wanted to
kill Ried.”  Id.
18. Id.  According to Robert Donnelly, a nineteen-year-old college student Gacy
intimidated into entering his car by pretending to be a police officer, Gacy held Robert’s head
under water until he lost consciousness, waited until the victim regained consciousness, and
then repeated the process multiple times.  MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 88.  This
water torture occurred after Gacy had brutally sodomized his victim and had played Russian
Roulette with his victim by pointing a revolver with a single bullet at the victim’s head and
repeatedly pulling the trigger until the young man begged Gacy to kill him to end the torture.
Id.  Instead of killing the young man, Gacy inexplicably halted his activities, drove the young
man to work, and released him.  Id.
contractor dropped Robert Piest’s body off a bridge into the Des Plaines
River.10
Police later discovered that the contractor was John Wayne Gacy, who was
eventually recognized as one of the most notorious serial killers of the
twentieth century.  After police determined that Gacy was the contractor to11
whom Robert had spoken, they questioned Gacy, who spontaneously
confessed to killing more than thirty boys and young men.   Gacy told police12
that he had buried most of his victims in the crawl space beneath his home and
had dumped the bodies of a few of his victims, including Robert Piest, in the
Des Plaines River.   Although Gacy later recanted this confession, when13
officers searched the crawl space beneath Gacy’s home, they recovered the
decaying corpses of twenty-nine boys and young men.   The police found four14
additional bodies in the river downstream from where Gacy admitted to
dumping them, bringing the total to thirty-three victims.15
Although many of the corpses were too badly decomposed to determine the
exact cause of death, most were found either with rope tied around their necks
or with objects stuffed in their throats.   While the bodies themselves could16
no longer verbally relate to authorities the abuses they had suffered, a few of
Gacy’s victims lived to tell horror stories of the torture they experienced at




19. MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 89-90.




24. Id. at 90.
25. Id. (second alteration in original).
26. Id. 
27. HAROLD SCHECHTER, THE SERIAL KILLER FILES 356 (2003) (explaining that many
viewed Gacy’s execution as “richly deserved”).
28. MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 114 (alteration in original).
29. People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ill. 1984), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-2-4 (1996), as recognized in People v. Wilhoite, 592 N.E.2d
48 (Ill. App. 1991); MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 114-15.
Although the living victims reported their harrowing experiences to
authorities shortly after Gacy released them, the police did not actively pursue
Gacy until the discovery of the thirty-three bodies.   Because Gacy was a19
prominent and active member of his community, the community reacted to the
news of his activities with stunned surprise.   Gacy had organized the Polish20
Day Parade in Chicago, held annual backyard barbecues with hundreds of
guests, and dressed up as a clown to entertain children at local hospitals.21
Gacy even had his photograph taken with First Lady Rosalynn Carter when
she visited Chicago.   To put it succinctly, “Gacy wasn’t merely well liked.22
He was admired.”23
An overwhelming media frenzy surrounded Gacy and his trial.   Beyond24
the Chicago community that was grappling with the incongruity of one of its
prominent citizens committing such horrific crimes, Gacy had piqued the
interest of the national and international communities:
[T]he story was told around the world by the news media . . . on a
daily basis.  In fact, with the advent of mogul Ted Turner’s Cable
News Network, headlines and one-minute summaries about Gacy
were beamed out to the world hourly.  And the newspapers!  They
had field days as gory headlines boosted circulation.25
The brutal nature of the torture Gacy inflicted and his bizarre manner of
disposing of the corpses of his victims had intrigued the entire country.26
Amidst society’s macabre fascination, however, definitive opinions existed
about how Gacy should be punished.   Terry Sullivan, the man who27
prosecuted Gacy, summed up the general societal reaction to Gacy by calling
him “a rat, mean, vile, base, and diabolical . . . the personification of evil.”28
Accordingly, an Illinois jury sentenced Gacy to death on March 12, 1980, for
the twelve murders he committed after 1976,  the year the U.S. Supreme29
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30. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).  The plurality first
determined that the death penalty does not invariably violate the Eighth Amendment because
of its history within American society and because the penological purposes of deterrence and
retribution comport with basic concepts of human dignity.  Id. at 182-83.  The plurality then
held that Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme was constitutionally permissible because it
required the jury to focus both “on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized
characteristics of the individual defendant” so that a jury could not “wantonly and freakishly
impose the death sentence.”  Id.  at 206-07.  The scheme advocated attention to the
“particularized nature” of the crime and the individual defendant by narrowing
the class of murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying 10 statutory
aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found by the jury to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt before a death sentence can ever be imposed.  In
addition, the jury is authorized to consider any other appropriate aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. . . . The jury is not required to find any mitigating
circumstance in order to make a recommendation of mercy that is binding on the
trial court, . . . but it must find a statutory aggravating circumstance before
recommending a sentence of death.
Id. at 196-97 (citations and footnote omitted).
31. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d at 1215-16, 1219.
32. Id. at 1216.
33. MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 121.
34. Internet search at http://search.msn.com (submit search for “John Wayne Gacy”)  (last
visited Oct. 29, 2005).
35. See GACY (Peninsula Films 2002).
Court held that the death penalty was not necessarily a cruel and unusual
punishment violating the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.   In30
response to Gacy’s appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that
although the jury had not sufficiently considered evidence about Gacy’s
background, including information about his abusive father, the lower courts
had not committed any reversible error.   The court reasoned, “A31
disapproving father does not excuse 33 homosexually related murders and
numerous other incidents of sexual torture and physical abuse.  We decline to
disturb the jury’s determination.”   Consequently, Gacy was executed on May32
9, 1994, after exhausting his appeals process.33
Public interest in Gacy has not waned since his death.  An MSN internet
search for “John Wayne Gacy” yields 53,333 results.   A film with the self-34
explanatory title “Gacy,”  complete with a maniacal clown adorning the35
cover, occupies a position on the new release wall at Blockbuster Video.
Authors have written an abundance of books either exclusively about Gacy
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/5
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36. See, e.g., MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2; SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 196-98;
DONALD J. SEARS, TO KILL AGAIN: THE MOTIVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SERIAL MURDER
21-36 (1991).
37. MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 118-19.
38. People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171, 1216 (Ill. 1984), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-2-4 (1996), as recognized in People v. Wilhoite, 592 N.E.2d
48 (Ill. App. 1991).
39. See infra Part III.A.
40. Mutilation is a form of the word “mutilate . . . 2. To deprive (a person or animal) of an
essential part, as a limb.”  WEBSTER’S CONCISE AMERICAN FAMILY DICTIONARY 346 (1997)
[hereinafter WEBSTER’S].
41. Necrophilia is a form of the word “necrophile . . . one who is morbidly attracted to
corpses.”  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 283 (1989).
42. Cannibalism is a form of the word “cannibal . . . 1.  a person who eats human flesh.”
WEBSTER’S, supra note 40, at 76.
43. See infra Part III.A.
44. See, e.g., SEARS, supra note 36, at 159 (explaining that one of society’s alternatives
regarding serial killers is to recognize them as monsters, seek them out, and destroy them).
45. See infra Part IV.A.
46. See infra Part IV.A.
and his crimes or inclusively about Gacy and other notorious serial killers.36
A market even exists for paintings Gacy completed while in prison.37
The preceding brief history of the crimes and infamy of John Wayne Gacy
is but a microcosm of society’s duality regarding serial killers.  The public
exemplifies this duality both by its obvious fascination with Gacy’s brutality
and by its determination that he deserved to die.   Seemingly, once society38
feels it has rid itself of the potential danger from the individual, it can
enthusiastically explore the life, crimes, and motivations of the serial
murderer.   As the facts become more bizarre, the exploration becomes more39
exciting.  If a serial murderer has a predilection for mutilation,  necrophilia,40 41
or cannibalism,  the public desires even more information, including any42
macabre details.43
Even though serial murderers fascinate society, society demonizes them as
archetypal villains.  Because most people believe serial killers are evil, one-
dimensional creatures without redeeming or humanizing qualities, some
members of society have concluded that the only acceptable means of
protecting the public from these characters is to exterminate them.44
Accordingly, the criminal justice systems of most individual states function to
identify and classify serial killers.   Such classification expedites the45
procedure with which the state may impose a sentence of death.46
The procedural system that determines the ultimate fates of these
individuals, however, has a duty to consistently apply the protections granted
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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47. See infra Part II.E.
48. JONATHAN H. PINCUS, BASE INSTINCTS: WHAT MAKES KILLERS KILL? 129 (2001) (“The
triad of abuse, mental illness with paranoia, and neurologic deficit has been present in almost
all the serial murderers I have examined.”).
49. Insanity is defined as “[a]ny mental disorder severe enough that it prevents a person
from having legal capacity and excuses the person from criminal or civil responsibility. . . .
Insanity is a legal, not a medical, standard.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (2d pocket ed.
2001).
50. Sean Spence, Bad or Mad, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 20, 2004, at 38 (“Such people are not
clinically mentally ill and they usually know when they are doing wrong.”).
51. See infra Part IV.A.
to offenders whose circumstances indicate reduced responsibility.   This47
comment recognizes that even though serial murderers commit deplorable
crimes and irreparably damage numerous victims and their families, they are
also complex, often damaged human beings, and should not be sentenced
solely on the basis of the crimes they commit.  Exploring the backgrounds of
these offenders reveals undeniable environmental, sociological, and biological
commonalities.   Their commonalities indicate that serial murderers suffer48
from a powerful compulsion to commit murder, which should decrease —
rather than increase — their legal responsibility for the crimes they commit.
This comment neither articulates a value judgment about whether capital
punishment is inherently just, nor suggests that a serial murderer who
possesses a combination of the commonalities typically attributable to serial
murderers justifies an insanity defense, which enables the defendant to
completely avoid legal responsibility.  Indeed, research suggests that many
serial murderers do not satisfy the legal definition of “insanity”  because they49
are capable of understanding the wrongfulness of their actions at the time their
crimes are committed.   Accordingly, an argument that would facilitate a50
serial murderer’s insanity defense would have dire consequences because
society certainly needs to be protected from individuals who have
demonstrated a clear inability to control their impulses.
This comment focuses on the treatment of serial killers in states’ capital
sentencing schemes.  Many states statutorily facilitate the execution of serial
killers by (1) structuring statutes to classify offenders who fall within certain
parameters as serial killers and (2) using the classification as an aggravating
factor that weighs in favor of death.   This comment argues that rather than51
classifying serial killer status as a statutory aggravating factor, states  should
classify serial killer status as a statutory mitigating factor because in many
jurisdictions the balance between aggravating and mitigating factors
determines the difference between a sentence of life and a sentence of death.
Part II of this comment explores the procedural aspects of a capital case,
specifically examining the procedural application, historical development, and
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/5
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52. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discussing the need to
have accurate information about both the details of the crime itself and the individual
characteristics of the offender before a sentence of death may be imposed).
53. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 370
(1995).
54. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192 (stating that “the problem will be alleviated if the jury is given
guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing
organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision”).
55. 428 U.S. 153 (plurality opinion).
underlying policies regarding the doctrines of aggravation and mitigation.  Part
III explores the phenomenon of serial murder, including general public
understanding and reaction, patterns of crime, and environmental and
biological commonalities.  Part IV synthesizes Parts II and III by exploring the
criminal justice system’s current treatment of individuals who commit serial
murder and suggesting that the existing criminal justice system’s treatment of
these individuals is inconsistent with the policies underlying the doctrines of
aggravation and mitigation.  Not only does Part IV critique the current system,
but the part also proposes a quantifiable means of classifying individuals as
“serial killers” for mitigation purposes.
II. Procedural Considerations for Capital Cases
The hallmark of the U.S. Supreme Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence
in the past twenty-six years is that a state may not implement a capital
punishment scheme permitting a sentence of death based upon consideration
of only the crime itself.   States must have additional safeguards in place for52
cases in which capital punishment is possible because the Court has recognized
that death as a criminal penalty is qualitatively different from sentences where
the most severe possible penalty is incarceration.   In capital cases, the Court53
requires the sentencer to consider the circumstances surrounding the crime,
including consideration of the defendant as an individual, before imposing the
death penalty.   Although policy considerations are the driving force behind54
the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, an in-depth examination of policy is
postponed in this comment until after an articulation of the basic framework,
including relevant terminology.
A. Individualized Consideration
To guide states and factfinders in determining whether the death penalty is
appropriate, the U.S. Supreme Court has centered its death penalty
jurisprudence on the doctrine of individualized consideration.  On the same
day the Court decided Gregg v. Georgia,  which held that the death penalty55
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56. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 301.
58. Id. at 303.
59. LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW
§ 7.01, at 51 (2004) (reporting that in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court “acknowledged that the
bifurcated procedure was one of the safeguards that helped ensure that the death penalty would
not be imposed in a wholly arbitrary, capricious, or freakish manner”).
60. Id. § 7.01, at 52.
61. Id. § 7.01, at 51-52.
62. Id. § 13.01, at 157.
63. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 49, at 99.
64. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 59, § 9.01, at 95-96.
was not per se cruel and unusual, the Court also decided Woodson v. North
Carolina,  the genesis of the individualized consideration doctrine.  In56
Woodson, the Court determined that states could not mandatorily impose the
death penalty on the basis of a particular crime  alone, but that, additionally,57
the factfinder must have access to “particularized consideration of relevant
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the
imposition upon him of a sentence of death.”   To facilitate this individualized58
consideration, states have developed a number of procedural conventions.
B. Bifurcation
First, although never explicitly mandated by the Supreme Court, due
process seemingly requires bifurcated trials as a procedural convention to
protect defendants in capital cases.   “Bifurcation” means that a single trier of59
fact decides the guilt of the defendant and the penalty imposed in separate
proceedings.   The guilt phase requires the state to prove the elements of the60
underlying capital offense beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the penalty
phase exists solely to determine whether a sentence of death is appropriate
considering the individual circumstances of the case.61
C. Consideration of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
As an additional procedural convention facilitating individualized
consideration, the finder of fact must consider both aggravating and mitigating
circumstances during the sentencing phase of a capital case.   Aggravating62
circumstances are defined as “fact[s] or situation[s] that increase the degree of
liability or culpability for a criminal act . . . and that [are] considered by the
court in imposing punishment ([especially] a death sentence).”   Statutory63
aggravating circumstances pushing a case into the realm of death penalty
eligibility are known as “eligibility aggravating factors.”   For example, a64
state may determine that murder committed for pecuniary gain is an eligibility
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/5
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65. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(h) (2004).
66. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 49, at 100.
67. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(i).
68. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(k).
69. FLA. STAT. § 921.0016(4)(k) (2004).
70. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-46 (1988) (holding that the Louisiana
sentencing scheme permitting the same aggravating circumstance to be used in both guilt and
penalty phases was constitutionally permissible as long as the scheme required the finder of fact
to find an aggravating circumstance that “genuinely narrow[ed] the class of death-eligible
persons”).
71. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 53, at 372.
72. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 59, § 9.03[C], at 101-02.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 9.02[A], at 98.
75. Id.
76. Id.
aggravating factor that permits the state to seek the death penalty for a
particular offender.65
In contrast to aggravating circumstances, mitigating circumstances are
defined as “fact[s] or situation[s] that [do] not justify or excuse a wrongful act
or offense but that [reduce] the degree of culpability and thus may reduce . . .
the punishment (in a criminal case).”   Examples of mitigating circumstances66
include “the influence of drugs or alcohol,”  “the defendant is not a67
continuing threat to society,”  and “[a]t the time of the offense the defendant68
was too young to appreciate the consequences of the offense.”69
Before the finder of fact considers the death penalty in a particular case, it
must determine that the facts of the case present at least one eligibility
aggravating factor.   A determination of whether such eligibility aggravating70
factors exist may be made during either the guilt or penalty phase.   When the71
jury determines that eligibility aggravating factors exist during the guilt phase,
such factors are generally included within the statutory language as an
additional element the state must prove in the prosecution of a predesignated
capital offense.   Thus, the defendant will not be found guilty in the guilt72
phase without one of these factors, but upon a determination of guilt, death is
automatically an available penalty.   Alternatively, a state’s scheme may73
require the determination of eligibility aggravating factors to be made in the
penalty phase rather than in the guilt phase.   When the jury determines that74
eligibility aggravating factors exist during the penalty phase, the state must
first meet its burden of proof regarding the elements of the underlying offense
during the guilt phase.   If the jury determines that the defendant is guilty of75
the offense charged, it must then decide whether any eligibility aggravating
factors are present during the penalty phase.76
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77. Id. § 9.02[B], at 99.
78. Id.
79. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 53, at 358 (discussing how critics have described the
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence as an “overly complex, absurdly arcane, and minutely
detailed body of constitutional law that . . . ‘obstructs, delays, and defeats’ the administration
of capital punishment”) (footnote omitted).
80. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that Georgia’s
method of comparing an individual sentenced to death with the sentences of “similarly situated
defendants” guards against the capricious imposition of a death sentence at the unfettered whim
of the finder of fact).
81. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower
court’s holding that the death penalty was appropriately imposed on a conspirator in an armed
robbery plan that ultimately led to the fatal shooting of a pawn shop owner because the judge,
when determining the appropriate sentence, only considered the three mitigating factors that
Ohio’s sentencing scheme permitted.  Id. at 608-09.  The Court concluded that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the
rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death.
Id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
82. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (holding that “the jury is required
Once the factfinder determines, in either the guilt or penalty phase, that at
least one eligibility aggravating factor exists, the focus of the case shifts from
eligibility aggravating factors to the broader category of all aggravating and
mitigating evidence.   If a case reaches this point, the factfinder ultimately77
determines whether the death penalty is appropriate.   Jurisdictions differ in78
their approaches to the  factfinder’s use of aggravating and mitigating evidence
to reach a decision about whether death is appropriate.
D. Weighing Versus Nonweighing Jurisdictions
The manner in which a state’s scheme requires factfinders to balance
aggravating and mitigating factors may result in an additional procedural
protection for capital defendants.  U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
articulating due process requirements for state capital punishment schemes can
be a confusing maze.   There are, however, a few rules and standards that79
remain consistent.  The Court has announced the following minimum
standards that must be satisfied before a jury may impose the death penalty:
(1) the state must follow a discernible method for narrowing the offenses that
make a defendant eligible for the death penalty;  (2) the state must permit the80
defendant to present every piece of evidence that the factfinder could possibly
consider a mitigating circumstance;  and (3) the factfinder must predicate a81
sentence of death on the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance.82
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/5
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during the sentencing phase to find at least one aggravating circumstance before it may impose
death”).
83. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 59, § 12.01, at 138 (noting that “there is no
standardized formula for the use of mitigation in the actual assessment of the individual’s
circumstances”); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 122 (1982) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (suggesting it is inappropriate for the Court to give guidance regarding the “weight”
of mitigating evidence).
84. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 59, § 12.01, at 137.
85. Id. § 7.03, at 55.
86. Id. § 13.02, at 159-62.
87. For states utilizing weighing sentencing schemes, see id. § 7.03, at 53 (including
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah).
88. Id. § 7.03, at 53.  States utilizing nonweighing sentencing schemes include Georgia and
North Carolina.  Id.
89. Id. § 7.03, at 54.
90. Id. § 7.03, at 53.
91. Id.
Beyond these basic requirements, the Court has not provided guidelines
about the weight the factfinder must give the mitigating evidence provided by
the defendant.   Procedural due process is deemed satisfied if the defendant83
simply has the opportunity to present mitigating evidence.   Therefore, a state84
court could constitutionally impose the death sentence upon the finding of just
one aggravating circumstance, provided that the defendant has the opportunity
to present some form of mitigating evidence.   Because the U.S. Constitution85
affords only minimal procedural protection to defendants accused of capital
offenses, some individual jurisdictions choose to adhere to the previously
stated minimum due process requirements while other jurisdictions provide
additional procedural protection to capital defendants.86
An additional procedural protection adopted by many jurisdictions is a
weighing,  rather than a nonweighing,  sentencing scheme.  Nonweighing87 88
sentencing schemes are straightforward applications of the minimum due
process requirements.  If the factfinder determines that an aggravating
circumstance exists and the court permits the defendant to present all possible
mitigating evidence, the factfinder has complete discretion over whether to
impose the death sentence or life imprisonment.   A “weighing sentencing89
determination,” on the other hand, requires the factfinder to consider all of the
aggravating circumstances and weigh them against all of the mitigating
circumstances.   In jurisdictions employing weighing sentencing schemes, the90
factfinder may impose the death penalty only upon a finding that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.   In some91
states that employ weighing sentencing schemes, however, the factfinder has
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92. Id. 
93. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 751-52 (1995) (per curiam) (holding an order
affirming the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty must be vacated when it was unclear
whether the appellate court actually reweighed the aggravating circumstances pursuant to the
invalidation of one of the aggravating circumstances relied on by the trial court because, in
order to impose the death penalty, the remaining aggravating circumstances must definitively
outweigh any mitigating circumstances).
94. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 53, at 386. 
95. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 59, § 7.03, at 53 (including Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah).  The thirty-eight states permitting capital
punishment include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.  Id. § 1.01, at 2 n.7.
96. See infra Part IV.B.
discretion to recommend that the court impose a life sentence even where the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.   In92
contrast, a factfinder in a weighing jurisdiction may never mandate capital
punishment when mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating
circumstances.   As an additional procedural safeguard, the U.S. Supreme93
Court determined that when a state has implemented a weighing scheme, “it
may not ignore the sentencer’s reliance on an improper factor in that structured
decisionmaking process.”   Twenty-six of the thirty-eight states where capital94
punishment is permissible  have adopted weighing sentencing schemes.  The95
protections afforded to a defendant by the weighing scheme requirements in
these twenty-six jurisdictions are greater than the bare minimum required by
the U.S. Constitution.
Because weighing schemes comprise a clear majority view in jurisdictions
where capital punishment is permissible, such schemes are the target of the
model proposed later in this comment.   The model would have minimal96
effectiveness in a jurisdiction with the more lenient and virtually unbridled
sentencing procedures permitted in a nonweighing jurisdiction because the
characterization of a particular factor as aggravating or mitigating would not
be as significant when the factfinder is not obligated to decide to impose the
death penalty pursuant to a quantitative weighing process.  If the factfinder can
only impose the death sentence when aggravating factors outweigh mitigating
factors, whether “serial killer status” is classified as an aggravating or a
mitigating factor truly becomes a matter of life and death.
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97. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
98. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
99. Id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
100. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
101. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 53, at 369.
102. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (“The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with
that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in
noncapital cases.”).
103. Id. at 604.
E. Operation and Policies Underlying the Requirement of Individualized
Consideration in Capital Cases
The procedural conventions articulated above facilitate the central doctrine
of individualized consideration.  Although the U.S. Supreme Court first
introduced the doctrine of individualized consideration in Woodson v. North
Carolina,  the Court further refined the doctrine two years later in Lockett v.97
Ohio.   The Lockett Court established the scope of the mitigating evidence a98
defendant may present to the factfinder, and created a broad protection for
defendants by determining that 
in all but the rarest kind of capital case, the [factfinder must] not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of
the defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death.99
In addition to defining the doctrine of individualized consideration and
determining the scope of the doctrine, the Court has also articulated a wealth
of policy rationales in support of the doctrine.
The preeminent policy behind the doctrine of individualized consideration
is that, because “death is qualitatively different from any other sentence,”100
nonindividualized “death penalty statutes run afoul of the basic norms of equal
treatment because they erroneously rely on the flawed belief that ‘every
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard
to the past life and habits of a particular offender.’”   Indeed, the Court has101
recognized that the fact of an individual’s commission of a crime does not
necessarily provide an adequate basis for determining that individual’s degree
of culpability because the uniqueness of humankind dictates that people are
shaped by the totality of their circumstances.102
Recognizing that death is qualitatively different from other possible
sentences,  the Court requires that sentencing in a capital case be conducted103
with the highest degree of reliability possible because a death sentence is final
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104. Id. at 605.
105. Id. at 603.
106. Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (remanding a death penalty
sentence because the jury was unable to give effect to evidence of the defendant’s mental
retardation.  According to the impermissible state scheme, once the case was death penalty
eligible, a death sentence could be avoided only if one of three possible special issues merited
a negative answer), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
107. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
108. (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (holding that the procedure on remand did not satisfy
the Court’s instructions in Penry I because the instructions required the jurors either to give no
effect to defendant’s mitigating evidence or to answer dishonestly with regard to special issues
where the sentencing relied on answers to the identical three special issues utilized in Penry I).
109. Id. at 797.
110. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982).
111. 455 U.S. 104.
112. Id. at 105-06.
113. Id. at 108-09.
and, once applied, cannot be altered.   In furtherance of this goal of accuracy,104
the Court mandates that the factfinder must possess the “fullest information
possible”  to encourage it to base its sentencing decisions on reasoned, moral105
responses rather than unguided, emotional responses.106
To facilitate reasoned, moral responses by factfinders, the Court requires
that factfinders be provided a means of considering and giving effect to any
existing factors that call for less severe punishment.   In Penry v. Johnson,107 108
the Court highlighted the semantic distinction that the factfinder must not only
consider but also give effect to relevant mitigating information.   This109
distinction is especially important in situations where the nature of the
mitigating evidence is such that factfinders can only appreciate the full effect
of certain mitigating circumstances in aggregation with other mitigating
circumstances.110
The Court provided powerful examples of the importance of aggregating
certain mitigating circumstances in the case of Eddings v. Oklahoma.   In111
Eddings, the defendant was only sixteen years old when he shot and killed an
Oklahoma Highway Patrol officer.   Although Eddings provided evidence of112
childhood abuse and neglect, psychological and emotional disorders, and his
readily apparent youth at the time of the offense, the state courts nonetheless
affirmed the imposition of the death penalty.   In articulating some of its113
reasons for remanding the case, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the
heightened consideration by the factfinder that an aggregate of circumstances
can merit:
Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance
is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. . . . In some
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114. Id. at 115 (citation omitted).
115. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding
that a sentencing scheme mandating the death penalty for specified offenses restricted the
factfinder’s ability to consider and give effect to mitigating circumstances); Penry v. Lynaugh
(Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (indicating that the state court could remedy a deficiency
in scheme by appropriate instructions enabling jurors to give effect to mitigating evidence),
abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
116. See Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001) (opining that where the trial
court informed jurors that they could give effect to defendant’s mitigating evidence by
answering untruthfully to one of the special circumstances, “the mechanism [the trial court]
purported to create for the jurors to give effect to th[e] evidence was ineffective and illogical”).
117. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at
305).
118. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
119. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 328.
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight.  But when
the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offense there can
be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings
by a harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance is
particularly relevant.114
Through its holding, the Court acknowledged that jurisdictions must
sometimes assist factfinders in giving mitigating evidence the weight it
deserves, particularly when the mitigating evidence achieves its full
significance only when considered in conjunction with other mitigating
evidence.
Jurisdictions work against the goal of assisting factfinders in giving effect
to mitigating evidence either by deficiencies in sentencing schemes or by the
absence of specialized jury instructions in a particular case.   Although the115
Court has not articulated definitive rules by which states must structure their
sentencing schemes and jury instructions, the Court’s guiding principle
regarding individualized consideration is that the mechanism used to assist
jurors in giving effect to mitigating evidence be effective and logical.116
Through the individualized consideration doctrine, the Court attempts to
underscore certain guiding principles including: (1) American criminal justice
systems must always recognize that “‘death is qualitatively different’” from all
other possible sentences;  (2) factfinders cannot be permitted to impose the117
death penalty upon consideration of the crime alone;  and (3) states must118
make every effort to ensure that sentencing decisions in capital cases are based
on the reasoned, moral responses of the factfinder rather than unguided,
emotional responses.   Indeed, the Court demonstrates a continuing interest119
in ensuring that factfinders fully consider mitigating evidence through the
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121. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
122. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 538 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 398 (citation omitted)); see
also Williams, 529 U.S. at 398-99.
123. See SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 1.
124. Id. at 369-402 (detailing examples of the “serial killer culture” in art, literature, films,
music, tourist locations, and memorabilia).
125. Id. at 385.
126. Id. at 386.
127. Id. at 386-90 (detailing the history of films portraying serial killers, from a 1920s film
about a pedophiliac sex murderer to more recent commercial films such as COPYCAT (Warner
Bros. 1995) and THE CELL (New Line Cinema 2000)).
128. Id. at 391.
129. See, e.g., id. at 3 (explaining that even early newspaper documentation of serial killers
thrived on the sensationalism produced by referring to serial murderers as “murder fiends,”
“bloodthirsty monsters,” or “devils in human shape”).
recent cases of Wiggins v. Smith  and Williams v. Taylor.   In each case, the120 121
Court found violations of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to effective
assistance of counsel where counsel failed to fully “investigate and present
mitigating evidence . . . that . . . taken as a whole, ‘might well have influenced
the jury’s appraisal’ of [the defendant’s] moral culpability.”   The following122
section considers the reactions of American society to serial killers and how
serial killers share certain distinguishing commonalities.  Furthermore, a study
of the current treatment of serial killers reveals that such treatment is at odds
with the policies of individualized consideration discussed above.
III. The Phenomenon of Serial Murder
A. The Serial Killer as an Object of Macabre Fascination
Serial killers fascinate American society.   Society evinces this fascination123
in music, films, and literature.   Prolific rock bands have written songs124
pertaining to the genre including “Midnight Rambler” by the Rolling Stones
and “Psycho-Killer” by Talking Heads.   Bands have incorporated serial125
killers’ names into their own names, including Ed Gein’s Car and Marilyn
Manson.   Filmmakers have created a multitude of films in the serial killer126
genre, dating back to the beginning of the history of motion pictures.   The127
public also proves its serial killer fascination with the commercial success of
thriller novels, such as Thomas Harris’s Red Dragon and The Silence of the
Lambs and James Patterson’s Kiss the Girls.128
The extent to which popular art and the media saturate society with fodder
for its macabre fascination with serial killers results in dehumanizing the serial
killer.   This dehumanization can rise to the level of creating an absolute lack129
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130. An example of this phenomenon occurred early one morning in the Oklahoma
Memorial Union on the campus of the University of Oklahoma during the preparation of this
comment in mid-November 2004.  A group of university students had gathered around a large-
screen television in one of the common areas of the Union at approximately 2:00 a.m. on the
morning in question.  The focus of the students’ attention was an HBO documentary about
Aileen Wuornos, the female prostitute who was responsible for the murders of seven men in
Florida in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  AILEEN: LIFE AND DEATH OF A SERIAL KILLER
(HBO/Cinemax Documentary Films 2003) [hereinafter AILEEN].  Wuornos’ life was the subject-
matter of the 2003 film MONSTER (Newmarket Films 2003) and the character for whose
portrayal Charlize Theron won an Academy Award for Best Actress.  See Oscar.com at
http://www.oscars.org/76academyawards/winners/03_lead_actress.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2005).
XXxThe documentary detailed the life of Wuornos, including information about her childhood,
her crimes, her time in prison while appealing her death sentence, and, ultimately, her
execution.  AILEEN, supra.  While examining Wuornos’s childhood, the documentary revealed
that Wuornos’s maternal grandparents had raised her after Wuornos’s mother abandoned her
during infancy.  Id.  The documentary also aired the prevalent rumor that Wuornos was fathered
by her maternal grandfather.  Id.  Discussions with Wuornos’s childhood acquaintances revealed
that after Wuornos gave birth to a child at age thirteen, she lived, for a time, outdoors in the
snowy woods near her home.  Id.  These acquaintances also revealed that they had witnessed
some of the physical abuses Wuornos’s grandfather inflicted upon her.  Id.
XXxThe audience of university students revealed that it did not recognize Wuornos’s humanity
by its reaction to the facts about her childhood and later portrayals of her life in prison as a
deeply disturbed, paranoid individual.  The students laughed.  The more outrageous the facts
presented, the louder they laughed.  Probably the most uproarious laugh of the night occurred
when the documentary revealed the final words uttered by Aileen before her execution: “I will
be sailing away with The Rock.  I will be back with Jesus Christ, like on Independence Day.
On June 6, just like the movie, on the big mother ship.  I’ll be back.  I’ll be back.”  Id.
131. State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 151 n.18 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., dissenting).
132. Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
of empathy by society for either the abuses perpetrated on individuals who
later become serial killers or any other circumstances that arguably contributed
to serial killers’ development.130
The absence of empathy and humanity creates a response in the collective
mind of society, and by extension the minds of jurors, that the only adequate
means of dealing with these creatures is to exterminate them because, as one
prospective juror explained, the mention of the words “serial killer” conjures
images of a “beyond hope situation.”131
Although society’s macabre fascination with the lives and crimes of serial
killers is not likely to wane, the criminal justice system does not have to reflect
the duality of society’s titillation by, and fear of, these individuals.  The most
effective means of ensuring a “reasoned, moral response”  to serial killers132
involves first understanding the common factors that contribute to their
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133. SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 7 (quoting J.E. DOUGLAS ET AL., CRIME CLASSIFICATION
MANUAL (1992)).
134. Id. at 9 (quoting the National Institutes of Justice).
135. Id. at 28-104.
136. MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 234 (“In any event, serial murder is an
international phenomenon.”).
137. See SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 28-104 (indicating that both genders and all races,
ages, sexual preferences, and occupations have representatives among the serial killer
population).
138. James Alan Fox & Jack Levin, Multiple Homicide: Patterns of Serial and Mass
Murder, 23 CRIME & JUST. 407, 413 (1998).
139. See supra note 40.
140. See supra note 41.
141. See supra note 42.
142. SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 30-41.
behavior and then creating a common sense means of ensuring that factfinders
give full effect to these factors.
B. Patterns of Crime
No universal formula exists to quantify serial killer status.  The FBI
qualifies a serial killer as an individual who commits “[t]hree or more separate
events in three or more separate locations with an emotional cooling-off period
between homicides.”   Another organization uses the following definition:133
A series of two or more murders, committed as separate events,
usually, but not always, by one offender acting alone.  The crimes
may occur over a period of time ranging from hours to years.  Quite
often the motive is psychological, and the offender’s behavior and
the physical evidence observed at the crime scenes will reflect
sadistic, sexual overtones.134
Although the stereotypical image of the serial killer is one of an intelligent
Caucasian male, twenty to thirty years of age, who targets predominantly
young women or men in their late teens or early twenties, in reality, the profile
is much more varied.   Indeed, serial murderers are found throughout the135
globe,  have representatives from various ethnicities and both genders,  and136 137
are not universally as intelligent as popular films and novels portray them.138
Although male serial murderers predominantly commit the types of sexually
sadistic murders involving ritual mutilation,  necrophilia,  or cannibalism,139 140 141
the serial killer phenomenon is not exclusive to the male gender.   Society142
commonly misperceives that only males serially murder.  Such a
misperception results from the graphic and visceral nature of their crimes,
usually evincing strong elements of sexual sadism, which attracts more
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143. Id.  Although Aileen Wuornos was described as the first female serial killer, this
portrayal is far from accurate.  Id. at 30.  Wuornos was unique because her methodology was
peculiar for a woman.  Id. at 31.  The methodology of murder preferred by women is often
poison, but Wuornos killed with a gun, an overtly violent and bloody method that is usually
preferred by men.  Id. at 30-31.
144. Fox & Levin, supra note 138, at 413.
145. Id. at 425 (“Only those with sufficient cunning to kill and get away with it are able to
avoid apprehension long enough to amass the victims necessary to be classified as a serial
killer.”).
146. PINCUS, supra note 48, at 130 (“One big difference, therefore, between serial and
nonserial killers is that the nonserial killer is caught before he can evolve into a serial
murderer.”).
147. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
148. SEARS, supra note 36, at 45.
149. Id.
150. PINCUS, supra note 48, at 130.
151. SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 349-51 (detailing ten examples of how serial killers were
detected).
152. MORRISON & GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 63-66 (discussing the unusual case of elderly
Albert Fish, serial child murderer and cannibal, who was apprehended in the 1920s);
attention from the media when compared to the generally less explosive facts
surrounding the crimes of female serial killers.143
Another public misperception of serial killers concerns the killers’ level of
intelligence.  Society’s belief that serial murderers are exceptionally cunning
and intelligent is not necessarily accurate.   While the most notorious serial144
murderers — those who have the greatest number of victims — tend to possess
higher than average intelligence, less intelligent serial murderers exist.  The
killers of below average intelligence, however, are probably not as notorious
because they do not have the ability to sustain their activities over a long
period of time without being captured by law enforcement.   By extension,145
some individuals who fit the serial killer profile are never classified as such
because they are discovered after committing only one murder.146
The stereotype that most serial killers are between twenty and thirty years
old  likely exists because most captured serial killers are in the twenty-to-147
thirty-five age range,  and many serial murderers commit their first murder148
at some point during their twenties or early thirties.   A possible reason why149
captured serial killers are usually within this age range is that most discovered
serial murderers are found before they have sufficiently refined their
methodology to avoid detection.   While serial killers captured in their late150
twenties or early thirties are ostensibly intelligent enough to avoid detection
long enough to accumulate a significant number of victims, their capture is
ultimately the result of their own human error.   Although authorities have151
discovered and apprehended older serial murderers,  they are a rarity.152
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SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 183-87 (providing a brief biography of Fish).
153. Ed Cameron, Some Psychoanalytic Aspects of Serial Homicide, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
2267, 2271-72 (2003) (“It has long been debated whether or not serial killers are mad or insane.
. . . This is the old ‘mad or bad’ debate.”).
154. See, e.g., PINCUS, supra note 48, at 29 (explaining how aggressive behavior is a result
of neurological deficits (biology), paranoid thoughts (biology and sociology), and abuse
(environment)); ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS
A CLINICAL DISORDER 26 (1993); SEARS, supra note 36.
155. PINCUS, supra note 48, at 129.
156. Id. at 27 (“The most vicious criminals have also been, overwhelmingly, people who
have been grotesquely abused as children . . . .”). 
157. SEARS, supra note 36, at 22.
158. Id. 
159. SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 51.
Perhaps the seeming rarity of older serial murderers is a function of their
refined ability to avoid detection until advancing age renders them physically
incapable of continuation.
C. The Composite of a Serial Killer — Commonalities
Arguably, a major component of society’s fascination with individuals who
commit serial murder is a desire to understand the underlying reasons for the
crimes.  The discussion about why serial killers commit the crimes they
commit centers on the classic “mad or bad” debate, which focuses on whether
the serial killer is simply motivated by some intrinsic evil or is the product of
nature and environment.   Researchers in the fields of sociology, psychology,153
psychiatry, and neurology have attempted to explain the behavior of serial
killers in terms of environment, sociology, biology, or various combinations
of these factors.154
1. Environmental Factors
Certain environmental commonalities are pervasive among individuals who
commit serial murder.   Once this fact is demonstrated, the relevant question155
becomes how these experiences shape the individual’s future behavior.
Research has overwhelmingly revealed that the vast majority of known serial
killers, and indeed perpetrators of violent crime in general, suffered various
degrees and combinations of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse as
children.   John Wayne Gacy, for example, suffered physical and156
psychological abuse at the hands of his father.   In addition to regularly157
beating young John, Gacy’s father constantly berated his son for being a
“sissy” and subjected the young boy to the sight of his own mother’s
beatings.   As a child, Albert Fish, an elderly child-murderer of the 1920s,158 159
was sent to an orphanage where he had a schoolteacher who would strip a
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161. Id. at 48.
162. PINCUS, supra note 48, at 130.
163. Id. at 144-45.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 146-47.
166. Id. at 147.
167. See, e.g., SEARS, supra note 36, at 83 (“This theory of learned aggression . . . fails to
explain serial killers such as Berkowitz or Bundy, whose childhood experiences were not
marked by their parents’ violence or aggressive behavior.  Indeed there is no evidence at all of
severe abuse.  Although violent behavior learned in childhood seems to be an important part of
what motivates many serial murderers, it cannot be the determinate factor.”).
168. Id.
child naked and flog him or her in front of other children.   Mary Bell, a160
young girl in Britain convicted of murdering smaller children, was forced into
prostitution by her mother, who would hold Mary down while men raped
her.161
A concrete example of how childhood abuse directly translates into the later
crimes of serial killers is the history of a serial murderer who killed six women
and cut off the feet of most of them.   During his childhood, both his father162
and his mother beat him.   The beatings administered by his father were163
ritualistic in that he would position the boy
on his bed, on his stomach or kneeling, a rope or belt immobilizing
his hands behind his back . . . [with his] pants down to his ankles,
thereby also immobilizing his legs. . . . He was struck ten to twenty
times on his buttocks, back, thighs, and the soles of his feet with
the belt.  These beatings lasted for several minutes and were
delivered two to three times a week over a ten-year period when
[the child] was five until he was fifteen. . . . [The father] “got into
it — he enjoyed it.”164
If these beatings were not sufficient to give the boy a particular interest in feet,
further inappropriate contact with his mother solidified this interest.  His
mother, dressed only in a slip that made no effort to conceal her nipples,
buttocks, and pubic hair, would often require the child to massage her feet.165
While the boy did this, his mother would “moan and gasp softly.”   The166
childhood abuse substantially involving feet relates directly to the
idiosyncratic ritual performed by the individual when he later committed his
serial murders and cut off the feet of his victims.
Some commentators have argued that a history of childhood abuse is not
universally present among individuals who commit serial murder.  Failure167
to allege abuse, however, as in the case of Ted Bundy,  does not necessarily168
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mean abuse was absent.  Many violent offenders fail to allege childhood abuse
for a number of reasons.  Abused children who later become violent often
display an inexplicable loyalty to the abuser, especially when the abuser was
a parent,  a suppression of memories,  or the belief that abusive169 170
punishments were “fair and not excessive.”   As a result, later offenders’171
reports of the extent of the abuses are “minimized and sanitized.”   In172
addition to the violent offenders’ failures to report abuse, “family members
may have strong motivations to hide the details of the killer’s social history,
especially when it is full of the grossest sexual abuse and/or severe physical
abuse.”173
Assuming the existence of childhood environmental abnormalities, various
disciplines theorize regarding how the abnormality shapes the later offender’s
behavior.  Some researchers have observed in serial killers the consistent
presence of abnormalities in the mother-child relationship.   “Mother may be174
rejecting and punitive or, to the contrary, seductive, at times openly so, and
over-protective and infantilizing her son.”   Freudian theorists posit the175
argument that, as a result of dysfunctional maternal relationships, sexual sadist
serial murderers, most of whom are male, are products of incomplete Oedipal
phases.   The absence of the father, the abandonment or other rejection by the176
mother, or the existence of inappropriate maternal intimacy results in the
continuation of the maternal figure as the object of the child’s drive.   In such177
cases, “the drive, which is always sexual, is not relegated to a socially
acceptable function.”   Accordingly, “[s]ince the prohibition of incest is178
never adequately instilled . . . nothing is prohibited.”   This absence of179
prohibition purports to explain the extreme behavior carried out by the sexual
sadist.   Where barriers are either unknown or nonexistent, the child later180
experiences difficulty in developing socially appropriate boundaries.181
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185. See, e.g., SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 25.
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188. SEARS, supra note 36, at 103-18.
189. Id. at 104.
190. Id.
191. PINCUS, supra note 48, at 19.
192. RAINE, supra note 154, at 194-95.
Theorists also postulate regarding how childhood experiences shape the
serial killer from a sociological perspective.   From this perspective,182
observing parental reactions to stressful stimuli shapes a child’s ability to react
to similar situations.   For example, “abusive parents, or those whose183
discipline is harsh or inconsistent, raise children who see violence as the only
means of dealing with difficulties in life[;] . . . the serial killer understands
only that aggressive behavior offers relief.”184
Consistent with the idea that serial killers share certain common
characteristics, commentators have argued that the existence of a so-called
“psychopathological triad” is an early indicator of individuals who are
predisposed to serially murder.   The triad includes: (1) bed-wetting lasting185
into adolescence; (2) pyromania; and (3) precocious sadism, usually in the
form of torturing small animals during childhood or early adolescence.186
Although the triad does not address the “why” behind the serial murderer’s
actions, it adds to the weight of the evidence indicating that discernible factors
exist supporting the proposition that individuals committing serial murder have
common experiences and modes of development shaping their behavior later
in life.187
2. Biological Factors
In addition to sharing similar environmental circumstances, neurological
studies support the theory that individuals who commit serial murder also
share certain biological characteristics.   At the forefront of biological factors188
behind the phenomenon of serial murder is damage to the frontal and temporal
lobes of the brain.   Neurologists believe these areas of the brain affect189
behavior, personality, and emotion,  and certain experts indicate that damage190
to these areas inhibits an individual’s ability to exercise impulse control.191
Researchers posit that the anger and hostility demonstrated by individuals with
injuries to these areas may be the result of a postconcussional syndrome that
subjects the injured individual to “headaches, irritability, and sensitivity to
noise.”192
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198. Id. at 59 (observing that the serial killer “is not completely devoid of all feelings; it is
only the emotions associated with empathy for others that he lacks”).
199. Spence, supra note 50, at 38.
200. Id.
201. See SEARS, supra note 36, at 59, 106-07.
202. See PINCUS, supra note 48, at 129 (“[T]hough brain damage is a frequent feature of
serial killers, the damage seems less severe than in nonserial killings.”); RAINE, supra note 154,
at 193; SEARS, supra note 36, at 111-12.  Raine’s research provides an explanation for how the
lessened degree of brain damage in serial as opposed to non-serial murderers operates to
improve their effectiveness.  See RAINE, supra note 154, at 98-99.  Raine indicates that the
prefrontal cortex operates more effectively in serial than nonserial murderers and “the presence
of prefrontal activity in the multiple murderer would be consistent with the planned, careful
execution of [serial] murders [as opposed] to the more impulsive acts of the one-time
murderer.”  Id. at 149.
Another biological explanation contributing to the behavior of many serial
killers centers on damage to the cerebral cortex and the reticular activating
system (the “RAS”).   The cerebral cortex is the area of the brain that reacts193
to stimuli from the environment.   Neurological or chemical deficiencies may194
cause the RAS to block “otherwise stimulating activity from reaching the
cerebral cortex.”   Such blockage, in turn, impairs an individual’s ability to195
receive stimulation from the everyday environment.   Accordingly, these196
studies indicate that a serial killer with a deficient RAS might be compelled to
commit acts of increasing violence to receive stimulation.197
Other biological and neurological studies focus on the serial killer’s ability
to commit brutal murders, often without compunction or remorse.   These198
studies center on the amygdala, the portion of the brain involved in the
processing of emotional cues.   Individuals with damage to the amygdala are199
apparently unable to detect fear or sadness in others; “[w]hat they seem to lack
is empathy.”200
The preceding biological research indicates that brain damage and
deficiencies impair impulse control, raise the threshold of activity necessary
to achieve stimulation, and suppress empathetic responses to suffering in
others.   Recognizing such facts, the appropriate inquiry becomes how these201
damages or deficiencies occur and why they are especially prevalent among
individuals who commit serial murder.  A possible answer to the question lies
in the high correlation between individuals who commit serial murder and the
severe head trauma resulting in brain damage that these individuals sustain at
some point before the murders began.202
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209. PINCUS, supra note 48, at 56.
210. Id. at 122.
211. Id. at 57.
212. Id. at 84-85.
In a study of death row inmates, with participants not exclusively drawn
from the serial killer population, all of the participants “had a history of severe
head injury.”   Leading neurologists who advocate criminal behavior as a203
clinical disorder carefully explain that even though neurologists have not
definitively established a causal link between head injury and aggressive
behavior, the empirical data certainly supports this conclusion.   Specifically,204
epidemiological data on head injuries for whites show that the
highest rates of head injury occur in the 15-19 year age group or
the 10-20 year age group, with rates at those ages being nearly
twice the overall occurrence.  This major elevation in the age curve
occurs at an earlier age than the peak for violent offending, which
tends to occur in the late teens and early twenties, as opposed to
property offenses, which peak earlier.  Again, these data do not
prove a causal link, but they are at least consistent with a model
that suggests that head injury precedes violence and crime.205
Other possible contributing causes of brain damage and deficiencies include
genetic flaws and birth complications.   Studies show significant correlation206
between the perinatal trauma incurred during delivery and violence and
impulsive criminal offenses.   Additionally, twin and adoption studies,207
though tenuous, provide promising data that genetic factors function in tandem
with environmental factors to influence psychopathic crime.   Although208
researchers emphasize that there is no “crime gene,”  some theorize that209
genetic abnormalities operate on a synaptic level to create neurological and
psychiatric illnesses.   An important and oft-observed effect of these illnesses210
is paranoia.211
Whether incurred through head trauma, genetic defects, or birth
complications, a wealth of empirical data exists that reveals an overwhelming
likelihood that a person participating in the sort of aggressive, antisocial
behavior common to serial killers will also, upon inspection, possess brain
function abnormalities consistent with those discussed above.   Attempting212
to explain the degree of antisocial behavior exhibited by serial murderers as
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merely a function of biological aberrations, however, risks oversimplification
because not all people who exhibit these sorts of abnormalities commit serial
murder.213
3. Synthesis of Biological and Environmental Factors
Environmental and biological factors may combine to form individuals with
a strong predisposition toward the commission of compulsive and
methodical  serial murder.  Researchers consistently observe the following214
three factors when assessing the serial killer’s physical examination and
environmental history: (1) childhood abuse, (2) neurological defects, and (3)
paranoid thoughts.   An explanation exists for the way environmental and215
biological factors work together to shape the serial murderer.   First, the216
childhood sexual, physical or psychological abuse creates perverse urges that
the serial murderer carries within himself,  and because of such abuse, the217
threshold of what the serial murderer deems unimaginable or abhorrent is
dramatically lowered; “the horror of their acts probably is an echo of the
ghastliness of the murderers’ own childhood experience.”  Paranoia, which218
is indicative of mental illness, functions in tandem with other neurological
deficiencies to inhibit the individual’s impulse control and restrict the
experience of emotion.   Succinctly stated, “[a]buse generates the violent219
urge.  Neurologic and psychiatric diseases of the brain damage the capacity to
check that urge.”220
Even if this explanation does not definitively describe the motivation behind
serial murder, it encompasses the commonalities researchers have observed in
known serial murderers.  Understanding how the commonalities combine to
create the compulsive aggressive behavior of serial killers is certainly
desirable, both to those who seek to treat these individuals and to those who
must encounter these individuals in the criminal justice system.  Unfortunately,
definitive knowledge beyond theoretical conjecture may not be possible in the
near future, but the observed commonalities exist almost universally in known
serial killers.   The nearly universal prevalence of these common traits221
indicates that these individuals are not merely evil beings, but are instead
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222. For a discussion of the policies underlying the U.S. Supreme Court’s death penalty
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223. See infra notes 224-26.
224. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(10) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (“The capital offense
was one of a series of intentional killings committed by the defendant.”); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(p) (West 2005) (“The defendant intentionally killed more than one
person in more than one criminal episode.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(k) (2004)
(“The defendant’s course of conduct resulted in the deaths of 2 or more persons where the
deaths are a probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.0016(3)(c) (West 2001) (“The offenses before the court for sentencing arose out of separate
episodes; the primary offense is scored at offense level 4 or higher; and the defendant has
committed five or more offenses within a 180-day period that have resulted in convictions.”);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(h) (2004) (“The defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the
commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will
probably constitute a continuing threat to society.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(9) (2004)
(“The murder was committed upon one or more persons at random and without apparent
motive.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(5) (LexisNexis 2003) (“Offender was
[previously] convicted of an offense an essential element of which was the purposeful killing
of or attempt to kill another, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the
purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.”); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(12) (2003) (“The defendant committed ‘mass murder,’ which is defined
as the murder of three (3) or more persons whether committed during a single criminal episode
or at different times within a forty-eight-month period.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(b)
(2004) (“[T]he homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or
criminal episode during which two or more persons were killed . . . .”).
shaped by their individual circumstances.  In light of these known
commonalities, if society dismisses the idea that serial murders are intrinsically
evil and seriously entertains the idea that serial killer classification is a clinical
disorder, then the treatment of the serial killer within the criminal justice
system needs to be reevaluated and reformed to better reflect the policies
underlying the system.222
IV. Analysis and Integration
A. Present Treatment of Serial Killer Status as Aggravating Factor
In jurisdictions employing weighing sentencing schemes, the classification
of the defendant’s particular circumstances as an aggravating or a mitigating
circumstance plays a substantial role in the issuance of a death sentence or a
sentence of life in prison.  In many weighing jurisdictions, the process dictates
the result when the defendant is a serial killer.   States utilize two methods223
to ensure that classification as a serial killer translates into a statutory
aggravating factor.  First, some states expressly address serial murderers in the
language of their aggravating circumstance statutes.   Second, courts have224
interpreted statutory language not explicitly referring to serial murderers in a
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(8) (LexisNexis 2004) (“The defendant has been convicted of another murder. . . . The
defendant has committed another murder, at any time, regardless of whether the defendant has
been convicted of that other murder.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(b) (West 1999) (“The
defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense of or of a felony involving the
use or threat of violence to the person.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(2)(1) (West 1999) (“The
offense was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for murder in the first
degree, or the offense was committed by a person who has one or more serious assaultive
criminal convictions.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(a)&(f) (Supp. 2004) (“The offender was
previously convicted of another murder or a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the
person, or has a substantial prior history or serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity.
. . . The offender knowingly created a great risk of death to at least several persons.”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(a) (West 2005) (“The defendant has been convicted, at any time,
of another murder.”); 12 OKLA. STAT. § 701(1)-(2) (2001) (“The defendant was previously
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. . . . The defendant
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person.”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9711(d)(11) (West Supp. 2005) (“The defendant has been convicted of another murder
committed in any jurisdiction and committed either before or at the time of the offense at
issue.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(1) (2004) (“[T]he offense of murder was committed
by a person who has a felony conviction for a crime of violence . . . .”).
226. See supra note 224.
227. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(12) (2003).
228. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (e)(1)(k) (2001).
manner practically equating statutory serial killer status with an aggravating
circumstance.   Whether by express language or court interpretation, the225
result is the same: classification as a serial killer is an aggravating
circumstance.
At least six states using weighing sentencing schemes have enacted
legislation expressly classifying the activity of serial killers as an aggravating
circumstance.   Tennessee was the first state to expressly classify serial killer226
status as an aggravating circumstance by adopting the following statutory
language: “The defendant committed ‘mass murder,’ which is defined as the
murder of three (3) or more persons whether committed during a single
criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight month period.”227
The language of a Delaware statute also evinces a straightforward intent to
classify serial killer status as an aggravating circumstance: “The defendant’s
course of conduct resulted in the deaths of 2 or more persons where the deaths
are a probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.”   The plain language228
of these statutes explicitly refers to serial killers because the statutes both
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229. SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 7 (The FBI’s definition of serial killers has three
elements: “(1) Quantity. There have to be at least three murders.  (2) Place.  The murders have
to occur at different locations.  (3) Time.  There has to be a ‘cooling-off period’ — an interval
between the murders that can last anywhere from several hours to several years.”).
230. See id.
231. Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Del. 1992).  Regarding the ritualistic nature of
serial killers’ crimes, see PINCUS, supra note 48, at 29.
232. See State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945, 951-52 (Tenn. 1987) (holding that the mass murder
aggravating circumstance was improperly applied to the defendant where the defendant had not
been convicted of two other murders about which the state introduced evidence during the
penalty phase of the third murder); Pennell, 604 A.2d at 1375 (finding no error in the trial
court’s determination that the “course of conduct” aggravating factor existed where defendant
had tortured, killed, and mutilated four women).
233. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d at 951-52.
234. Id. at 951.
235. Pennell, 604 A.2d at 1378. 
236. See supra note 225.
require multiple offenses over a marked period of time.   Additionally, the229
language of the Tennessee statute referring to committing murder at different
times within a forty-eight month period applies to serial killers because it
reflects the tendency of serial killers to commit their acts in separate
episodes.   Furthermore, the “course of conduct” language in the Delaware230
statute arguably refers to serial killers by recognizing the ritualistic aspect of
the crimes committed by serial murderers.231
Even if the plain language of these statutes does not clearly implicate serial
killer status, the courts’ application of these statutes supports such a
conclusion.   The Tennessee Supreme Court interpreted that the “within a232
period of forty-eight . . . months” language applied to “serial or mass murders
perpetrated over an extended but definite period and committed in a similar
fashion as part of a pattern.”   Additionally, the Tennessee court recognized233
that the legislative history behind the statutory amendment incorporating the
aforementioned aggravating circumstance into the sentencing scheme revealed
a reaction to the crimes “committed by Wayne Williams in Atlanta, or by the
‘Son of Sam’ in New York.”   Similarly, the Supreme Court of Delaware234
interpreted the “course of conduct” aggravating circumstance as particularly
applicable to a defendant who had committed serial murder because “the
record reflected, beyond a reasonable doubt, [that] he was a relentless serial
murderer.”235
In contrast to the states that explicitly address serial killer status as a
statutory aggravating circumstance, other states achieve the same result by
applying statutes that, on their faces, do not specifically address serial
killers.   An example of such a statute is the following aggravating236
circumstance adopted by the legislature of New Jersey: “The defendant has
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been convicted, at any time, of another murder.”   This statute could plainly237
apply to anyone previously convicted of a murder in any situation not
exclusive to the serial murder paradigm.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey,
however, reasoned that the factfinder appropriately determined that this
aggravating circumstance was present in the case of a defendant who had
murdered at least three victims according to the serial murder paradigm
because “[t]he legislative history of the 1985 amendment discloses that the
Legislature specifically intended to permit the use of convictions on appeal to
insure that serial killers do not evade the consideration of their multiple murder
convictions as aggravating factors.”238
Of the twenty-three jurisdictions employing weighing sentencing schemes,
at least nineteen equate serial killer status with a statutory aggravating factor
either through the express language of the statute or by judicial application.239
Significantly, in these states, classification as a serial killer likely has an
appreciable impact on whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors
for capital punishment sentencing purposes.   Plainly stated, serial killer240
status in weighing jurisdictions is a matter of life and death.   If the behavior241
of serial killers is consistent with a disorder motivated by a compulsion,242
however, then perhaps state legislatures should reevaluate these statutes.
B. Serial Killer Status as Mitigating Factor
1. Quantifiable Means of Determining Serial Killer Classification for
Mitigation Purposes
Because of a potential negative reaction to a proposal that classifies serial
killer status as a mitigating circumstance, a scheme permitting such a result
should employ strict standards.  Although a state has virtually unlimited
discretion to determine whether the state or the defendant bears the burden of
proving the existence of mitigating circumstances and to determine the
applicable standard of proof,  the following model seeks to approach these243
issues in a manner that respects the states’ established schemes while
recognizing the unique context of serial murder.
The model is straightforward for states whose statutory language expressly
targets serial killer status as an aggravating circumstance.  First, these states
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244. The removal of the statutory aggravating circumstance is particularly appropriate where
the circumstance specifically addresses serial killers, such as the statutes listed in note 224,
supra, because if not removed, recognition of the serial killer disorder as a mitigating
circumstance would be cancelled out by the continued existence of the serial killer aggravating
circumstance.
245. This standard of proof requires “[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is
highly probable or reasonably certain.  This is a greater burden than preponderance of the
evidence, the standard applied in most civil trials, but less than evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, the norm for criminal trials.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (8th ed. 1999).
246. Naasz v. Dretke, No. Civ.A.3:01-CV-1058-M, 2003 WL 22329017, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 6, 2003) (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1977)).
247. See, e.g., Koleles v. State, 660 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1983) (requiring the criminal
defendant to prove mitigating factors by clear and convincing evidence).
248. See PINCUS, supra note 48, at 29, 154-56.  Because Pincus’s research indicates these
three factors exist almost universally among serial killers, the mitigating circumstance should
apply when the three factors are proven to exist when offered in the serial murder context.
must delete the serial murder aggravating circumstance from the statute.244
Second, such states must create a statutory mitigating circumstance
recognizing the disorder.  Third, the defendant must bear the burden of
proving the existence of the mitigating disorder with clear and convincing
evidence.   This third requirement is appropriate because the Court has245
determined that “[i]t is not inconsistent with a defendant’s due process rights
to require him to shoulder the burden of proof on issues raised in mitigation
of punishment.”   Additionally, some states require the clear and convincing246
standard of proof to establish mitigating factors.247
To prove the existence of the mitigating disorder, the defendant must offer
proof of three elements: (1) childhood abuse; (2) neurological impairment
demonstrated either by extrinsic evidence consistent with such impairment,
including head trauma and birth complications, or by expert testimony,
including qualitative neurological testing; and (3) paranoia demonstrated either
by testimony of witnesses acquainted with the defendant before or during the
timeframe of the murders, or by expert diagnosis of psychiatric disease
consistent with paranoia.248
In states where the express language of the aggravating circumstance statute
does not isolate serial murderers but the judicial application achieves such a
result, the model is even less complicated.  The state must simply create the
statutory mitigating circumstance, and the defendant must prove the above
three criteria with clear and convincing evidence.
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255. Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
256. See supra Part III.B (discussing the often sexually sadistic nature of the crimes serial
killers commit).
257. See supra Part III.A.
2. Synthesis of the Policy Reasons Behind the Mitigation Doctrine and
Serial Killer Status as a Disorder
The previously proposed model ensures the procedural protections espoused
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina,  Lockett v.249
Ohio,  and those cases’ individualized consideration progeny because the250
model provides a means of fulfilling the policy considerations underlying
those cases.  In contrast, schemes automatically classifying serial killer status
as an aggravating circumstance impermissibly permit jurors to impose capital
punishment predicated on the class of offense alone.   In Lockett, the U.S.251
Supreme Court definitively stated that the unique nature of death penalty cases
requires that the factfinder possess “the fullest information possible” about the
circumstances of each individual defendant.   The model proposed herein252
provides, as contemplated by the Court, an effective and logical mechanism
to enable factfinders not only to consider the mitigating evidence with which
they are presented, but also to give effect to that evidence as mandated by
Penry v. Johnson.253
Further, the Woodson court highlighted the importance of guiding
factfinders in imposing a sentence commensurate not only with the crime
committed but also with the individual defendant’s culpability.   To make254
such a determination, the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh articulated that the
criminal justice system should provide factfinders with tools to facilitate a
reasoned, moral response rather than an unguided, emotional one.255
Undeniably, crimes committed by serial killers are often brutal, grotesque, and
nauseatingly shocking.   The extreme nature of the crimes committed,256
however, combined with pop culture and the media’s tendency to dehumanize
serial killers  leads to the logical conclusion that jurors exposed to pop257
culture’s portrayal of serial killers will most likely respond emotionally to the
visceral nature of the crimes unless the criminal justice system provides them
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“beyond hope situation”).
259. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
260. PINCUS, supra note 48, at 129.
261. See Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) (quoting Johnson v. Texas,
509 U.S. 350, 381 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give
full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances.”) (alteration in original)).
262. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
263. See supra Part IV.B.2.
264. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949) (holding that the sentencer should be in “‘possession of the fullest information
possible’”)).
265. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson,
428 U.S. at 285.
with a clear framework in which they must make a reasoned, moral
response.258
The proposed model provides this logical framework because it permits the
finder of fact to consider how mitigating evidence, including childhood abuse,
neurological impairment, and paranoid thoughts, can achieve greater import
when considered in the aggregate rather than individually.  The Court’s
Eddings decision recognized the importance of considering mitigating factors
in their totality, and not individually, in certain circumstances.   In the case259
of serial killers, this type of wholistic consideration is particularly appropriate,
especially considering that this combination of factors is known to be almost
always present among those who commit serial murder.   By facilitating and260
legitimizing consideration of mitigating circumstances in their entirety, states
provide a more accurate and reliable method for factfinders to measure the
individual serial killer’s actual culpability for the offenses committed.   This261
accuracy and reliability is the paramount concern for sentencing in capital
cases because “death is qualitatively different.”262
Finally, and importantly, the proposed model does not dictate the sentence
that the sentencer must impose.   Instead, the proffered model only guides the263
sentencer to give appropriate weight to all of the evidence Lockett permits a
defendant to present, which is any and all evidence that a finder of fact could
consider mitigating.   The Court has repeatedly articulated that imposing the264
death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punishment.   Accordingly, use265
of the proposed model leads the sentencer to one of three possible conclusions:
(1) the evidence presented failed to establish that the statutory mitigating
disorder was present, and the balance of evidence weighs in favor of imposing
the death penalty; (2) the evidence presented sufficiently established the
presence of the statutory mitigating disorder, but nonetheless, the balance of
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all the evidence weighs in favor of the death penalty; or (3) the mitigating
circumstance was present, and its presence tips the balance toward a life
sentence rather than death.  Even though death is still a possible outcome
under the proposed model, its imposition would occur in accordance with a
process designed to provide a heightened level of rationality and morality.
C. Counterarguments and Rebuttal
Acceptance of the model proposed by this comment is only plausible upon
an understanding of the nature and causes of the serial killer disorder.
Additionally, the policies and practicalities underlying the criminal justice
system in general, and capital punishment sentencing jurisprudence in
particular, must be appreciated before the model is accepted.  Without such an
understanding, the idea of modifying sentencing schemes to consider serial
killer status as a mitigating circumstance seems patently absurd because the
modification would permit incongruous results.  Simply stated, a person who
has murdered two, three, fifteen, or even fifty human beings in a premeditated
manner could receive a less severe sentence than a person who had murdered
only one person, and the less severe sentence is possible precisely because the
individual killed more than one person according to a pattern.  Arguments
against the proposition that sentencing schemes should consider serial killer
status as a mitigating circumstance fail, however, in light of a true
understanding of both the nature of the serial killer disorder and the criminal
justice system.
The first justification for considering serial killer status as aggravating
rather than mitigating recognizes the state interests of retribution and
deterrence in applying the death penalty.   The state interest in retribution266
appears especially heightened in the context of an offender who has killed
more than one person under circumstances indicating that the victims were
subjected to sexual sadism.   The states’ retributive interest is insufficient,267
however, because it impermissibly bases the sentence of death upon
consideration of the crimes alone without giving consideration to the
individual circumstances of the defendant.   Further, requiring a convicted268
offender to spend life in prison without the possibility of parole does not
frustrate the states’ retributive interests.   Lastly, states do not deter serial269
killers by imposing a sentence of capital punishment upon them.  A person
suffering from a compulsive disorder is not deterred by even his intelligent
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abuse, and neurological deficits also exists in other violent and sexual offenders and illustrating
how a pedophile who understood that pedophiles are targeted by other inmates in prison did not
modify his behavior in conformance with this understanding).
271. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in
Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1993) (explaining how prosecutors emphasize a
defendant’s future danger to society in a way that creates fear in jurors about the results if the
offender escaped or obtained release).
272. See id.
273. Id.
274. See PINCUS, supra note 48, at 156.
275. See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 271, at 4.
276. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 59, § 13.05, at 169.
277. Id.
278. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 164 (1994).
279. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 59, §13.05, at 173.
understanding of possible consequences because his problem is one of impulse
control, not the result of a conscious cost-benefit analysis.270
A second argument supporting serial killer status as an aggravating factor
is the proposition that current procedures imposing a death sentence on serial
killers function to protect society from inalterably dangerous murderers.271
Advocates of this position rely on the following three distinct rationales: (1)
the offender will not serve the remainder of his life in prison;  (2) if the272
offender is released from prison, society will be in danger because serial killers
are unamenable to treatment;  and (3) even if serial killers remain in prison,273
other inmates are in danger.   Each of these justifications contain274
fundamental errors.
The first concern is that some procedural loophole will eventually permit
the release of the offender into free society where he will once again prey on
innocent victims.   This fear’s existence is especially apparent in light of275
studies revealing the extent to which jurors and other lay persons
misapprehend sentencing options providing for life in prison without the
possibility of parole.   The common misconception is that offenders under276
such a sentence may nonetheless manipulate the system and obtain release.277
States are only required to allow defendants to provide accurate information
about the likelihood of parole eligibility when the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness is at issue.   States are thus apparently free to permit jurors to278
believe that parole eligibility is a possibility for a particular offender when, in
fact, such a possibility might not exist.   This misconception can be remedied279
by fully instructing jurors about the actual application of any sentence the jury
might impose on an offender who is eligible for the death penalty and by
informing jurors that a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
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parole equates to a natural death sentence.  In other words, the individual will
never be released from prison because he will never be eligible for parole
consideration or early release.280
The second argument of society-protection advocates follows from the first.
Advocates fear a serial killer who might somehow legally obtain release from
prison will pose a risk to the public.   The prospect of a serial murderer’s281
eventual release from prison is especially frightening in light of the argument
that serial killers are inalterable recidivists who are unamenable to treatment.282
For this reason precisely, prosecutors often recognize offenders’ capacity for
future dangerousness when seeking a sentence of death.   Indeed, a strong283
argument exists that because of the unique manner in which environment and
biology shapes serial killers, they cannot be completely cured.   As the Court284
explained in Penry v. Lynaugh, however, espousing the argument that an
individual’s frailties render that person unamenable to treatment, and thus
inalterably dangerous, operates as a “two-edged sword.”   To provide the285
factfinder with sufficient information to permit it to give full effect to the
mitigating evidence, the serial killer defendant is also admitting the
compulsive nature of his behavior, which will likely lead directly to a finding
that the future dangerousness aggravating factor exists.  Because of the high
likelihood that a serial murderer will continue to be a danger if not
contained,  states must protect their citizens by ensuring that serial murderers286
spend the remainder of their lives in prison without the possibility of parole.
This goal can be accomplished by mandating that if the factfinder determines
that the statutory mitigating factor proposed by the model is found, the
minimum possible sentence is life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. This approach  ensures that the offender never obtains release from
prison nor poses a risk to the public.
Third, society-protection advocates assert that even if incarcerating serial
killers protects the free section of society, the prison population and prison
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employees are still at risk and deserve protection.   The flaw in this argument287
is perhaps the flaw most easily identified and overcome.  Research reveals that
the structure of prison life serves to provide an effective control mechanism
over the serial killer’s compulsive tendencies.   A possible explanation for288
this phenomenon is that incarceration prevents these individuals from
murdering according to their idiosyncratic predilections because  “[t]he need
for the right time, place, and victim both stamps these acts as bizarre and
protects fellow inmates from the serial killer’s vulnerabilities to violent
action.”   Accordingly, the portion of society associated with prisons is289
apparently effectively protected while the serial killer is incarcerated.
A final counterargument against the proposed model is that requiring the
factfinder to consider the mitigating evidence in the aggregate imposes too
much restraint on the discretion of the factfinder by dictating the weight the
factfinder must give to the evidence.   This argument fails because, rather290
than dictating the weight the factfinder must give to the evidence, the proposed
model permits the factfinder to determine the weight the evidence receives
based on “the fullest information possible,” in accordance with the driving
policy behind Lockett.   As Eddings recognized, sometimes the factfinder’s291
ability to consider the fullest information possible requires external guidance
to place the information in the appropriate context.   The context of292
mitigating evidence is particularly important with regard to serial killers
because of the manner in which child abuse, neurological defect, and mental
illness resulting in paranoid thoughts function to influence the compulsive
behavior of the serial killer.   States can provide the appropriate external293
guidance by adopting the proposed measures to ensure that jurors base their
decisions on a sufficient understanding of the unique manner in which these
three factors operate in the development of the serial killer.
V. Conclusion
The criminal justice system’s current treatment of persons classified as
serial killers with regard to the sentencing procedure in capital cases does not
demonstrate consistency with policies underlying the constitutional
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requirement of individualized consideration.  As demonstrated in the recent
cases of Wiggins v. Smith  and Williams v. Taylor,  the U.S. Supreme Court294 295
is committed to ensuring that all capital defendants receive sentences based on
full consideration of mitigating circumstances.   Sentencing schemes296
automatically considering serial killer classification as an aggravating
circumstance effectively make a constitutionally impermissible value judgment
that the crimes committed, considered alone, are so heinous that they
invariably merit the death penalty.   These schemes only cursorily consider297
mitigating evidence, and in the case of serial murderers, mitigating evidence
requires consideration at a higher level than is present under the existing
schemes.  The legal system must be prepared to recognize that certain factors,
standing alone as mitigating circumstances, do not have the full mitigating
weight they merit unless considered in light of their effect in the aggregate.
Only then will factfinders perform their duties with the aid of a balanced
equation.  This balanced equation permits them to sentence serial killers
according to a reasoned, moral response pursuant to an understanding that the
totality of each individual’s circumstances creates unique frailties that
sometimes reveal reduced culpability for even the most despicable crimes.
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